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ANTICIPATING THE TSUNAMI: RUMOURS,
PLANNING AND THE ARBITRARY STATE
IN ZIMBABWE
Joost Fontein
BREAKING HOUSES, ANTICIPATING THE TSUNAMI
One morning in July 2005, Tanaka phoned to say he was dismantling
the ‘cottages’ (one-roomed houses) behind his house in Harare’s
southern, and relatively poor, low-density suburb of Hatfield. Arriving
at the scene I found him breaking the walls of one ‘cottage’ with a small
hammer. With two tenants, we spent most of the day dismantling walls,
removing windows and doors, stacking reusable bricks, and debating
what to do with the remaining rubble. Covered in dust, we kept a
watchful eye on the front gate, waiting for the police and council
officials to turn up to destroy any ‘illegal structures’. As long as we were
dismantling the houses ourselves, we felt confident they would not do
it for us; in this way we would be able to save some of the materials. It
was a slow business and by mid-afternoon we had only dismantled two
out of five cottages.
As we worked Tanaka explained how, as a boy, he had helped
his late father form the concrete blocks we were now trying to save.
‘Zvinorwadza!’ (‘It hurts!’) he exclaimed, and we all understood that
this referred not only to the destruction of inherited property, but
also to the loss of rent from these cottages that supplemented his
low income, which is under much pressure from family responsibilities
also inherited upon his parents’ death. ‘Zvinorwadza!’ could also have
referred to the situation of the families – tenants but also friends – that
Tanaka had been forced to evict earlier that morning. For the
two tenants helping us it undoubtedly resounded uneasily with the
knowledge that their homes were next in line for our hammers.
But not that day; by late afternoon the tsunami, as Operation
Murambatsvina/Restore Order was popularly known as, had not
arrived. Three days later the government announced a reprieve for
low-density suburbs:1 ten days to regularize plans for ‘illegal structures’,
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1 ‘Zimbabwean high-income homeowners get temporary demolition reprieve’, Voice
of America, 16 July 2005, 〈www.zimbabwesituation.com/jul17_2005.html〉, accessed 15
December 2008.
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at a price of Z$24 million.2 Two weeks later on 27 July 2005, a period
punctuated by much media activity surrounding a visit by the UN
special envoy, Mrs Tibaijuka, Vice-President Mujuru announced that
Operation Murambatsvina was now over.3
A few days after destroying two of his ‘cottages’, at an impromptu
barbecue at my home, Tanaka mused he had been lucky the tsunami
officials had not arrived that day and that there had been no time to
destroy the other cottages – ‘that is lucky for me and lucky for the people
living in them’. He could have added he was lucky the actual roof
over his head had not been threatened and, furthermore, that in low-
density Hatfield the tsunami only amounted to small groups of officials
wandering from house to house, inspecting planning documents and
notifying people to dismantle ‘unplanned structures’ – rather than
materializing as forced evictions from ‘illegally’ squatted areas, or as
bulldozers flattening informal markets and homes, offering owners and
inhabitants only minutes to remove property, as had happened in
Chitungwiza, Mbare and elsewhere across Harare and the country.4
As some people made comparisons with past, Rhodesian-era ‘slum
clearances’, another guest at the party commented that his home, a
rented backyard cottage nearby, had been spared (‘it had a plan’,
apparently) but his workplace was due for destruction. He and his
colleagues had decided to risk the uncertainty, and ‘wait until the
bulldozers arrived’. But the family of four from Chitungwiza, who now
squashed in with the six of us already sharing a two-bedroom flat, had
had hardly any opportunity to wait before their two-room cottage was
destroyed by officials some weeks before.
That day Tanaka said he was now concerned about the planning
fees he might have to pay,5 but a few weeks later, after the end of the
‘operation’ was announced, he felt more confident that he could avoid
paying for ‘formal planning’, as by then it seemed unlikely the tsunami
would strike again.6 At the barbecue Tanaka asked me, off the cuff,
what the ‘party’ was for. I said it was a spur of the moment thing; as
it was Saturday, we decided to invite a few friends over. He replied,
‘That’s exactly like this tsunami. One day somebody just went to work
and said, let’s do this, and that started all this off!’ (Notes, 18 July
2005).
2About £1,400 at the official exchange rate of that moment, or £522 on the black market,
then (27 July 2005) at Z$46,000/£.
3ZHR NGO Forum (2005b: 1). Despite Mujuru’s announcement official activities against
informal traders and illegal housing continued sporadically for several more months.
4Potts (2006a) examines the different definitions of ‘squatters’, ‘illegal structures’ and
‘informal housing’ that have been employed in government statements, newspapers and NGO
reports, presenting a nuanced view of the particular urban areas, populations and types of
housing most severely affected by Murambatsvina. See also Bratton and Masunungure 2006;
Mujere 2007; Vambe 2008a.
5Adding that ‘those people [city council] will be making a lot of money’ (Notes, 18 July
2005).
6Anyway, he added, ‘the council offices are so overrun with applications for planning
registration, it seems unlikely they will be able to enforce it all’ (Notes, 18 July 2005).
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LUCK AND PLANNING7
Although the impact of Zimbabwe’s tsunami on Tanaka’s situation
seems minor in comparison to the many, much less fortunate,
people in high-density suburbs and peri-urban settlements, or working
as informal traders, elsewhere across Zimbabwe,8 the events above
do reveal a tension common to many experiences of Operation
Murambatsvina. This tension relates to the disjuncture between official
pronouncements about the need to ‘restore order’ – to reassert formal
planning procedures, bye-laws and local state institutions – and the
contradictory experience of the apparently arbitrary application and
often extreme, sometimes violent, execution of the operation by council
officials, police and the military, which for many seemed to operate
outside of the legitimate, bureaucratic ‘state’. There were many ironic
and graphic illustrations of this tension. If in Harare the aim was to
restore the city’s ‘sunshine’ status, Murambatsvina often created more
squalor than it removed. In many cases good-quality, albeit unplanned
or ‘illegal’ housing was destroyed, only to be replaced by exactly
the kind of ramshackle, temporary structures which are common to
so many informal urban settlements across the continent, but had
been comparatively rare in Zimbabwe. The destructions created vast
quantities of rubble, which were such an eyesore in Chitungwiza and
elsewhere that councils issued statements requiring people to remove
rubble under threat of further fines.9 With reusable materials stacked up
loosely to create temporary shelters for the newly homeless, unusable
rubble was promptly deposited into the streets, filling potholes and
exacerbating the ‘post-tsunami look’ from which the operation got its
nickname.10
7Fieldwork for this article was conducted under trying circumstances. Awaiting formal
clearance for another research project in Masvingo, and conscious that I was under some
surveillance, I could not collect the ethnographic material in this article through formal
interviews and surveys. Instead, it was collected through careful observations and recordings
of events and conversations witnessed across Harare, but particularly in the southern, low-
density suburb of Hatfield and in the high-density area of Chitungwisa, the two areas where I
spent most of my time between June and September 2005. During this period I lived in a small
backyard cottage in Hatfield with five other people, where we were joined in late June by a
family of four from Chitungwiza (relatives of my housemates) whose rented accommodation
was destroyed in the events. Later, when I was doing fieldwork in Masvingo (September
2005–July 2006), I frequently returned to Harare for fuel, rest and to visit relatives in Hatfield
and Chitungwiza. In Masvingo I often visited contacts in Mucheke high-density suburb from
where further ethnographic material derives. While the arduous conditions of its collection
means the ethnography here may appear anecdotal, it is based on having been there at the
time, talking to people on the ground, helping some of those whose homes were destroyed,
and in one case assisting in the very demolitions. These experiences texture the article’s
engagement with the myriad of rumours that circulated at the time.
8One estimate suggested up to 700,000 people were made homeless, and that indirectly
almost a quarter of the population were affected (Tibaijuka 2005).
9 ‘Clean-up: rubble to attract $1.5 m penalty’, Sunday Mail, 19 June 2005.
10The requirement to remove rubble also led to a new kind of informal economy as groups
of enterprising young men offered to dismantle ‘illegal structures’ and remove rubble in return
for fees. In a strange way, then, the ‘demolitions’ did ‘create jobs’ as ‘unemployed urban
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The tension between the stated aim of ‘restoring order’, and the
operation’s brutal and indiscriminate (but often admittedly thorough
and efficient) execution, was reflected in public forums. While
government media stressed the reassertion of order and planning,
the MDC opposition, independent media, the United Nations11 and
various NGOs emphasized the government’s abandonment of legal
rights and its recourse to a new set of violent political exclusions. In
a small way, the events that I have begun to describe capture how this
tension appeared on the ground. Tanaka and many others I spoke to
in Hatfield, in high-density Chitungwiza and elsewhere, talked of their
situation as a mixture of luck and planning. Contrary to both sides of
the polarized media debates, I suggest the tsunami was experienced both
as a ‘reassertion’ of formal planning, which resonated with people’s
memories of past (colonial and post-colonial) enforcement of urban
regulations, limitations on informal markets, and sometimes evictions
and clearances (Dorman 2007: 10; Mujere 2007: 6; Horn 1994),
and as a ‘display’ or demonstration of ‘state power’ deployed on a
whim. In this article I argue it is precisely in the ambiguity and
uncertainty generated by this tension, between the spectacle of ZANU
PF’s ability to deploy ‘state power’ as it chooses (that is, arbitrarily),
and the resonances of official appeals to the reassertion of formal,
bureaucratic planning and ‘governance’, that the political advantages
of this operation for the ruling party become apparent.
ARBITRARY FORCE
‘He (President Mugabe) is like our father – but one who takes a stick
and beats the child who says “I’m hungry”.’12 This quote encapsulates
what I mean by suggesting that Operation Murambatsvina was, in
part, experienced as a demonstration of ‘arbitrary force’. Like the
father who beats his child, the brute force of the operation was
‘arbitrary’ not so much because it did or did not conform to the
plethora of different logics and motivations ascribed by diverging
rumours – there were too many contradictory explanations circulating
for such an argument to work. Rather, it was ‘arbitrary’ exactly because
its unexpected suddenness and brutality was experienced regardless
of whether its motives would ever be properly understood. In other
words, Zimbabwe’s tsunami demonstrated clearly that this level of state
machinery could be deployed at the whim of the ruling echelons of
ZANU PF, regardless of the uncertainty that surrounded, and still
youths . . . organised themselves into demolition gangs hired to pull down illegal structures
for a fee’, as was reported in the Sunday Mail (26 June 2005).
11According to the UN representative, the operations were ‘carried out in an indiscriminate
and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering and, in repeated cases, with
disregard to several provisions of national and international legal frameworks’ (Tibaijuka
2005: 1).
12 ‘Commentary from couple living in a lean-to in Njube, Bulwayo, June 2006’, cited in
Solidarity Peace Trust (SPT) 2006.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 30 May 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.188
ANTICIPATING ZIMBABWE’S TSUNAMI 373
surrounds, the intentions behind these events. Whatever motivations
may have lain behind Operation Murambatsvina, it was a massive
spectacle of power that clearly displayed the capacity of the ruling elite
to deploy state forces as it chose. I am arguing that, like the ‘arbitrary
power’ of a monarch (cf. Foucault 1975), Zimbabwe’s tsunami was
experienced, in part, as an ‘expression of sovereignty’ akin to (but
necessarily less ‘ultimate’ than) Mbembe’s notion of ‘necropolitics’
(2003: 11).
Indeed the popular use of the word tsunami to describe the operation
captures perfectly its perceived ‘arbitrariness’, as well as graphically
portraying the levelled houses and rubble that lined suburban streets
after May–July 2005. It was also, obviously, a way in which people
were able to relate their experiences to international events earlier
that year. Yet even the discrepancy in the Shona and English
versions of the official names given to the programme–Operation
Murambatsvina (literally, refuse/reject the rubbish/filth) and Operation
Restore Order – captures something of the tension I am trying to
highlight. As one NGO report remarked,13 there is an ‘unfortunate
similarity in meaning of Murambatsvina and Gukurahundi ’, the latter
being the much more violent government campaign in Matabeleland
in the 1980s, when an estimated 20,000 civilians were killed (CCJP
1997). Whether these resonances were deliberate or not, it is clear that
many victims felt that they were the tsvina (literally, dirt, filth, human
waste) that was to be cleared out.14
This attitude was not surprising given that Police Commissioner
Chihuri reportedly said the purpose of the operation was ‘to clean
the country of the crawling mass of maggots bent on destroying
the economy’.15 Similarly, Deputy Minister Chihota (Industry and
International Trade) told Parliament that the ‘thousands of refugees
spawned by “Operation Murambatsvina” without rural homes to
go to were not “indigenous”’.16 Noting the efforts that were made
to relocate some newly homeless urban communities to rural areas
13ZHR NGO Forum 2005a: 17.
14 ‘Please ask [President] Mugabe what it is they want from us. What is the dirt they want to
clear out – is it us?’ These were the words of a woman who lost her home and livelihood during
Operation Murambatsvina, Bulawayo (Amnesty International Report AFR 46/005/2006, 8
September 2006, p. 1).
15The Times, 17 June 2005.
16Zimbabwe Independent, 1 July 2005. Although he was forced to withdraw his remarks
by the Deputy Speaker, such comments contributed to rumours that the urban clearances
were a ‘thinly veiled ethnic cleansing campaign’. Another ‘senior ZANU PF official’, strongly
opposed to the operation, described the MP’s remarks as ‘irresponsible’ and revealing of
the ‘latent xenophobia and subliminal tribalism within a misguided clique in the ruling
party’. Perhaps reflecting the widespread unease about the ruling party’s precise motives for
Murambatsvina, rumours also circulated about deep internal divisions within ZANU PF over
the execution of the operation. One junior ZANU PF MP resigned his seat in direct defiance
(see Zimbabwe Independent 1 July 2005 and The Standard 19 June 2005), but suggestions that
more would follow did not materialize. That MP was subsequently stripped of his position
and lost his farm and other privileges, indicating that if divisions within ZANU PF did exist,
such internal opposition was adequately quelled from within.
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(Potts 2006a: 279–80; Potts, forthcoming), many interpreted the op-
eration as an attempt by the ruling party to further marginalize largely
opposition-voting urban populations17 – an ongoing process of political
exclusion best exemplified by President Mugabe’s well-known deni-
gration of the people of Mbare as ‘people without totems’ (Ranger
2004a; Mujere 2007: 13).18 Suggestions were also made that the ex-
ercise was a Maoist attempt to engineer a rural revolution,19 effecting
demographic manipulation by ‘returning’ troublesome urban people to
rural areas under the closer political supervision of ‘traditional author-
ities’ allied to the ruling party.20 Other rumours suggested that if the
aim was to force urban people into rural areas, it was to supply labour
for resettled farms in order to bolster the faltering land reform exercise,
particularly in the context of drought and dramatic food shortages.21
In May 2006, long after the operation’s ‘official’ end, one middle-aged
vegetable vendor at a Harare shopping centre told me how a few days
previously she had been arrested during a police raid,22 and, instead of
being fined or imprisoned, she and others were sent to labour on a farm
belonging to Vice-President Mujuru.23 She described the two days and
one night they spent working there, ‘harvesting for their families, but
they don’t even think about our families. What can we do for our fam-
ilies?. . . Surely God will punish them for that!’ (Notes, 2 June 2006).
The experience of the tsunami as a brutal demonstration of ZANU
PF’s ability to deploy ‘state power’ arbitrarily (sometimes, as above,
in the personal interests of particular individuals) also derived from
the apparently selective manner in which the operation was executed
17For example, ‘Mugabe’s pattern of repression’, Zimbabwe Independent, 1 July 2005;
see also Ndlovu 2005; Raftopoulos 2006: 217; Kamete 2006.
18One day at Queensdale shopping centre, I witnessed an obviously irritated man asking
a street vendor harshly, ‘What are you doing here? Didn’t Mugabe tell you people to go
kumusha [to your rural home]? So what are you doing here? Go kumusha!’ (Notes, 6 July
2005). The man’s statement mirrored comments by government officials at the time about
the need for ‘urbanites’ to return ‘back to the rural home, to reconnect with one’s roots
and earn an honest living from the soil our government repossessed under the land reform
programme’, which reinforced the notion that the operation was a means of re-defining and
narrowing Zimbabwean citizenship to those who had rural ‘roots’ to return to (Potts 2006a
and 2008; Mujere 2007; Vambe 2008b).
19 ‘Echoes of Mao in Mugabe’s blitz’, Zimbabwe Independent, 24 June 2005.
20Some NGOs and churches later agonized that in their efforts to assist people made
destitute and homeless by the exercise, they were in fact carrying out the ruling party’s political
dirty work (HRW 2005: 18).
21Crisis Group Africa (CGA) (2005: 5).
22During the tsunami, and for a long period after its official end, such informal traders had
to play a game of cat and mouse with police officers. Like the elderly vendors in Mbare and
Highfields that Mujere interviewed (Mujere 2007: 14–16), for some of these middle-aged
vendors, running away upon the arrival of officials and police is a less than effective strategy
of evading arrest. One day I came to buy some tomatoes when one of them approached me in
tears, explaining how all her tomatoes had been deliberately squashed under the boots of an
overzealous police officer.
23 In 2007 Mail and Guardian (2 March 2007) reported that hundreds of prisoners
were being sent every week to work and labour on farms owned by senior politicians and
army officials. See also ‘ “Operation round up”: vagrancy – a new target’, in SPT (2006:
Section 4, 26).
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in different urban areas, and the fact that, in some well-reported
cases, it was licensed street vendors, formal housing cooperatives and
other declared structures, alongside their illegal counterparts, which
were affected.24 Such cases intensified the aura of uncertainty that
surrounded the operation, but did not lessen its demonstrative affects.
The examples of legalized peri-urban settlements like Epworth, and
‘squatter camps’ where previous government programmes had resettled
people moved from illegal sites within the city (Hatcliffe Extension and
Porta Farm), as well as formal housing cooperatives run by churches
and, in some cases, war-veteran groups (Tongogara Park on White
Cliff Farm), which also fell foul of the operation, exacerbated both
the uncertainty and the sense of the arbitrariness of the exercise (Potts
2006a: 282).25
The manner in which the exercise was carried out differently in low-,
medium- and high-density residential areas of Harare also reinforced
the experience of the tsunami as a display of force by the ruling party
against urban areas where opposition to the ruling party was most
significant. Talking to a young man in Chitungwiza, I described how
my friend Tanaka had needlessly destroyed two of his houses before the
ten-day reprieve for low-density areas was announced.26 He responded:
‘There was something unfair about the fact that people in low density
suburbs were given that chance because here in Chitungwiza people were
simply told to destroy their illegal structures.’ I replied by saying that ‘in
Mbare it was even worse . . . in Mbare the bulldozers just turned up and
people scarcely had time to remove their belongings before their houses were
razed to the ground, sometimes with road graders!’ He responded by saying
that was because people in Mbare have a reputation for being tough; as he
put it, ‘they often boast that they can beat up the police’ so that is why they
turned up in force and gave people very few chances. (Notes, 30 July 2005)
The young man’s response verbalized a common, and probably
justified, perspective that it was poorer, high-density townships (like
Mbare and Chitungwiza), peri-urban settlements (like Epworth) and
‘squatter’ settlements (like Hatcliffe Extension and Porta Farm) that
24As Potts has discussed, the disproportionate focus on such cases (which were by far in
the minority) by the international media illustrates how independent observers often reified
the government’s own rhetoric, by implying that the real ‘crime’ of the operation was the
destruction of legally planned structures, alongside the ‘poor, “shanty” housing . . . [that]
somehow, regrettably, deserves demolition’ (Potts 2006a: 276).
25 In Chitungwiza, the apparent senselessness of the events further exasperated residents
when rumours circulated that Ignatius Chombo, himself formally responsible for the exercise
as the Minister of Local Government, had tried, unsuccessfully in some cases, to intervene
to save houses belonging to cooperative projects of which he was patron, in apostolic areas of
that sprawling suburb (Notes, 30 July 2005).
26During our long conversation, he described how, just after the tsunami had struck, the
road we were walking along ‘had been full of people living out in the open . . . those few days
when it was very cold and it rained, then people really suffered and a lot of people went away,
either kumusha [to their rural homes] or elsewhere. Others crowded in their relatives’ houses’
(Notes, 30 July 2005).
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were the main target of the operation (Potts 2006a: 286).27 Certainly
the worst cases of police brutality, mass arrests and the use of
overwhelming force occurred in these areas. This reinforced common
perceptions that the exercise was a form of punishment for urban
voters who had overwhelmingly voted against the ruling party in the
parliamentary elections of March that year, an opinion that was voiced
by MDC MP Paul Themba-Nyathi.28
The young man’s comments about the reputation of communities in
Mbare and other poorer townships probably do, partly, explain why
more extreme force was used in those areas. But a related point is
the trajectory of the crisis itself. In May, when the tsunami first hit
the townships, it was met with relatively fierce resistance in the form
of riots and public demonstrations. On 23 May 2005 a ZUPCO bus
was stoned, and a policeman seriously injured in riots in St Mary’s
suburb of Chitungwiza, and another eleven officers were hurt when
police ‘stormed Chigovanyika Shopping Centre’.29 On the same day,
the ‘Army [was] put on alert as fears of civil unrest mount’, and
police ‘set up makeshift camps in the city’s low income suburbs such
as Highfields, Glen View and Dzivarasekwa’.30 The next day in Glen
Norah ‘tensions were at a knife edge’ after flea markets were destroyed,
and the streets were being patrolled by ‘heavily armed police’.31 At
the same time the operation spread to other cities including Bulawayo,
Kadoma, Nyazura, Odzi, Rusape32 and later Mutare.33 By Friday 27
May 2005, ‘anti-riot police stormedMbare’ sparking ‘a violent response
from informal traders who quickly ganged up against the police and
overpowered them’.34 On the same day, Police Commissioner Chihuri
warned ‘any miscreants within our society who may wish to show their
discontent against the current clean up operations to stop the day
27Although Potts’s careful analysis indicates that, contrary to popular stereotypes, the
‘major share’ of demolitions ‘would have come from backyard shacks in formal townships’
(2006a: 284).
28 ‘1 million face eviction in Zimbabwe’, Associated Press, 24 May 2005. Later I heard
rumours which suggested that the ‘ten-day window’ announced for lower density areas was
a result of government fears that the wealthier people in those areas were more likely to seek
legal recourse, or, alternatively, because the ruling elite had their own properties and families
to protect in those areas. There were some legal challenges but few met with any great success.
One case was brought by Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights on behalf of a cooperative
in the Hatcliffe suburb of Harare, against the Ministry of Local Government and Harare city
council. The judge found that in that particular case the actions of the government were legal,
but also stated that ‘untold suffering’ had been caused to people and that ‘a few days notice
was . . . not adequate’ (see ZHR NGO Forum 2005a: 22; and Human Rights Trust 2005: 4).
29Zim Online (SA), 23 May 2005. While in Chitungwiza ‘angry residents beat up the police’
(Zimbabwe Standard, 24May 2005), inMabvuku ‘police fought running battles with residents’
(New York Times, 24 May 2005).
30Zim Online (SA), 24 May 2005.
31Zim Online (SA), 25 May 2005. Riots and looting also broke out in Glen View and
Budiriro as ‘angry mobs vandalized property and barricaded roads’, Daily Mirror, 25 May
2005.
32SW Radio Africa, 25 May 2005.
33Zim Online (SA), 31 May 2005.
34Zim Online (SA), 27 May 2005.
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dream forthwith as the ZRP [police] has adequate resources to ensure
that peace and tranquillity prevail’.35 By 31 May 2005 an IRIN report
(2005) estimated that around 20,000 people had been arrested.
These angry outbreaks of rioting and the heavy police responses
led to suggestions that the aim of the operation was, as MDC leader
Morgan Tsvangirai put it, ‘to provoke urban residents into resisting the
brutal campaign as an excuse to declare a State of Emergency’.36 As
often seems to happen,37 there were also predictions that the operation
might provoke a popular uprising that would finally force dramatic
political change.38 But these predictions were premature, and the initial
riots did not lead to a ‘state of emergency’.39 Heavily reinforced police
ensured that, within a few weeks, images of rioting were replaced
by much more depressing images of resigned residents dismantling
their own houses well in advance of the arrival of police and council
officials (Notes, 16 June 2005). Yet after the riots subsided, new
forms of ‘resistance’ did seem to emerge, as rumours spread about
residents deploying witchcraft to exact revenge on the officials and
police. In Chitungwiza I heard a story of a bulldozer driver targeted with
witchcraft by an angry resident: the driver, so the story went, was found
frozen, hands stuck fast to the steering wheel of his machine (Notes, 16
June 2005). Another story told of a bewitched man, perhaps a soldier
or a policeman, who ‘accidentally’ shot himself.40 The extent to which
such more subtle forms of subterfuge, or even ‘everyday’ resistance
(Scott 1985 and 1990), were actually deployed are, of course, hard to
fathom, but such stories do illustrate how people tried to respond to
and make sense of the unexpectedness of Operation Murambatsvina as
it unfolded.41
35Daily Mirror, 27 May 2005.
36Zimbabwe Standard, 24 May 2005; see also Associated Press, 24 May 2005.
37For example, in response to the violent beatings of opposition leaders in March 2007,
see ‘Tsvangirai: Zimbabwe at “Tipping Point”’, Associated Press, 18 March
2007, 〈www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar19_2007.html#Z3〉, accessed 15 December 2008;
‘Leaders plan end to Mugabe era’, BBC News, 24 March 2007, 〈www.zimbabwesituation.
com/mar25_2007.html#Z1〉, accessed 15 December 2008; ‘Mugabe’s enemies now within
the gate’, The Zimbabwean, 17 April 2007; ‘Change is coming – the first step in a long journey’,
Mary Ndlovu in Fahamu (Oxford), 29 March 2007.
38For example, Lovemore Madhuku, chairman of the National Constitutional Assembly,
thought ‘now people are really going to react’, and another commentator suggested that
‘maybe this will be the spark that ignites all of us from our passivity and makes us all rise up
and refuse to be abused any longer’, Mail and Guardian, 25 May 2005, and ‘Burning what’s
left’ 24 May 2005, 〈www.zimbabwesituation.com/may25a_2005.html#link11〉, accessed 15
December 2008.
39And, as Bratton and Masunungure put it a year later (2006: 45), ‘if OM [Operation
Murambatsvina] was destined to “tip” ZANU-PF out of power, then such a change would
probably have happened by now’. See also CGA 2005.
40 In Mucheke, Masvingo’s high-density suburb, I was told a story of a policeman who
destroyed a street vendor’s eggs and bananas. Later, at his own home, the same policeman
became very sick, and started to complain that he was being bitten by eggs and bananas!
(Notes, 19 December 2005).
41One informal vendor near Great Zimbabwe in Masvingo suggested that, because officials
were aware witchcraft was being used against them, ‘when they came to the reserves they were
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Such stories were often told in conversations as people questioned
why police and other officials were carrying out orders, as if they and
their relatives were not also affected by the very same operation (Notes,
16 June 2005). This incongruence was the cause of considerable
anxiety and uncertainty among many people I spoke to in Chitungwiza,
Hatfield and Masvingo. Stories about war veterans also being
targeted by the clearances reinforced this sense of uncertainty,42
and for quite a long period public denials by Comrade Chinx (a
well-known musician/war veteran and government ‘praise singer’)
that his own house had been destroyed in the operation whilst
he continued to sing the government’s praises, were the subject
of jokes amongst people in both high- and low-density areas in
Harare.43
PLANNING
Narratives which illustrate how Operation Murambatsvina was
often experienced as a brutal demonstration of ‘state power’, are
repeated across the broad array of NGO reports published since the
events, which understandably focus most attention upon its dreadful
humanitarian effects. Such reports often emphasize the apparently
unplanned spontaneity of Operation Murambatsvina in order to stress
the unpredictable, ‘tyrannical’ nature of the Zimbabwean state. After
‘perhaps falling back in horror at what they have done’ (Ndlovu
2005), the sudden announcement of Operation Garikai,44 at the same
time as UN envoy Tibaijuka arrived to assess Murambatsvina, was
perceived with particular scepticism. As my friend Tanaka put it
‘Operation Garikai? There is no such thing!’ Independent media reports
highlighted the impossibly ambitious targets of Garikai, particularly
given the dire economic situation and the fact that no budget allocation
had been set aside to fund the ‘$1 trillion facility availed by the
government’.45 This lack of fiscal planning, in particular, was used to
much more careful because everyone knows that in rural areas there is a lot of witchcraft’.
‘That is why’, he explained, ‘at the craft centre they were very careful not to destroy anyone’s
crafts at all’ (Notes, 19 December 2005). Although urban areas were, by far, the worst
affected, the operation also targeted informal traders, especially makorokoza (illegal gold
panners) and residents in rural areas and at growth points. As Chombo put it, ‘this exercise
is a national exercise and will go to rural areas. We are not going to spare any pocket which is
illegal’; see CGA 2005: 6, fn. 2.
42For example, ‘Govt clean-up, war veterans targeted’, Daily Mirror, 27 May 2005; see also
ZHR NGO Forum 2005a: 17.
43See Sunday Times, 19 June 2005.
44Meaning, literally, ‘Live well’, this ‘follow up’ operation was meant to create new housing
for the recently dispossessed. Government newspapers began reporting the allocation of
stands and the construction of model houses on White Cliff Farm before Operation Garikai
was formally announced to coincide with the beginning of the UN Special Envoy’s mission.
See The Herald, 17 June 2005, 21 June 2005, 27 June 2005, 28 June 2005, 30 June 2005 and
Sunday Mail, 26 June 2005.
45When Vice-President Msika announced Garikai, The Herald (30 June 2005) reported
that ‘at least 10,000 housing stands would be developed at White Cliff farm’, and a
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illustrate the ‘unplanned’, random nature of the whole exercise, whilst
predictions that the huge unbudgeted expenditure would worsen the
economy were used to illustrate the irresponsible incompetence of the
government.46
But fiscal discipline aside, the situation was not quite as simple
as is often made out by the normal voices of opposition; official
pronouncements about the aim to ‘restore order’ were not just an
empty façade; official appeals to a ‘reassertion of planning’ did
have important, if varying, resonances for people across Zimbabwe’s
urban areas, alongside the demonstration of power. Of course
these resonances differed across Zimbabwe’s hugely divergent urban
populations.47 A growing body of literature indicates the deep
historical complexity of differing, overlapping and entangled African
urban imaginaries, aspirations, and notions of respectability, traversing
divisions of class, age, gender, religion and political allegiance (whether
to differing nationalist or labour movements pre-independence, or
opposed political parties since 1980) across urban Zimbabwe (cf.
Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni 1999; Scarnecchia 1999; West 2002;
Barnes 1999; Yoshikuni 2007; Maxwell 2006; Ranger 2004b; Ranger
2008). Nevertheless, official appeals to ‘order’ and ‘planning’ did
hold resonances for people across many of these social divides; they
certainly did amongst both poorer and wealthier residents of high-
density Chitungwiza and low-density Hatfield with whom I spoke,
regardless of whether they actually approved of the operation, which
most, understandably, did not. The point is that official appeals to
‘planning’ were recognizable to people in these different urban areas,
particular those who lived in, rented or owned backward ‘cottages’,
who were numerically probably the most affected by the operation,
particularly in Harare’s townships (Potts 2006a: 284).48
This recognition of official appeals to planning was perhaps best
reflected in how people everywhere – in both Hatfield and Chitungwiza
further 23,000 ‘had been demarcated at Oda, Hopley and Glaudina farms’ around Harare.
These figures rose sharply in later reports, and one report states that the government
promised ‘a million new houses and plots would be established across Zimbabwe in
the next four years’ (see ‘Zim houses “not for officials”’, News24, 14 March 2006,
〈www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar15_2006.html〉, accessed 15 December 2008). A year
later, it was reported that ‘only a handful of houses have been built . . . these have been
surrounded by scandal, including corrupt allocation of the few hundred houses built, to ruling
party members. In western Zimbabwe, not one house under this scheme is fit for occupation as
there are no services connected; out of more than 100,000 displaced people in this region, not
one person has yet been officially housed’ (SPT 2006: 8).
46See, for example, Zimbabwe Independent, 1 July 2005 and 8 July 2005; Daily Mirror, 7 July
2005.
47 Just as the ‘brand of respectability’ of the Assemblies of God described by Maxwell
(2006: 81) differed from the ‘middle-class respectability’ discussed by West (2002), or the
elite Christian identity of the Samkange Methodists (Ranger 1995).
48Although Potts states that ‘legal servants quarters’ in low-density areas (LDAs) would
not have been affected and that the destruction of other backyard accommodation ‘appears
to have been relatively exceptional’ in these areas (2006a: 285), in the poorer low-density
areas in the south of Harare that I was visiting at the time, a considerable amount of backyard
housing was destroyed, and many people were made homeless or lost vital income as a result.
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at the very least –were to be seen dusting off old planning documents,
or newly applying to regularize buildings, or discussing the finer details
of what constituted a ‘temporary’, ‘permanent’ or ‘illegal’ structure.49
This sometimes triggered memories and comparisons with earlier
‘slum clearances’ and past (colonial and post-colonial) periods when
enforcement of planning regulations had been much more stringent
(particularly in high-density areas) than in the intervening period of
the late 1990s (Notes, 16 June 2005). At one household in Waterfalls
a group of middle-aged people spent much of the day discussing the
tsunami:
Mai nini explained that the tsunami had reached Southerton, but her place
had not yet been affected . . . the house and cottage were OK, and planned,
but at the back there are two houses that have a permit as ‘temporary
buildings’ . . . she was worried that these might have to be destroyed. Sekuru
M. was explaining to Mai nini . . . that there is an issue to do with temporary
housing. If it is built with panels, like a panelled durawall, then it counts
as temporary, but if the houses are of brick then they are no longer seen as
temporary, and therefore must be destroyed. Mai nini confirmed that they
are of brick. Sekuru explained that is also why they are worried about their
durawall, because, unlike most, it is built of brick and therefore does not
comply with planning regulations . . . . He also discussed his well/borehole,
which should, officially, be more than 10 metres from any boundary fence,
however he also stressed that in this tsunami the officials seem more
concerned about structures and are likely to overlook the well, particularly
in the context of water shortages. (Notes, 12 July 2005)
Although these people, like Tanaka and many others in low-density
areas, were in no way the worst affected, even for them the operation
provoked considerable anxiety which manifested itself in remarkably
minuscule and detailed conversations about what constituted an ‘illegal
structure’. Yet despite these people’s worries and concerns, there was
also broad agreement that in principle Operation Murambatsvina was
a good thing.
Sekuru M and Mai nini were agreeing that town was looking cleaner now,
and that there were fewer thieves about, and that overall the tsunami was
probably a good thing. . . . Sekuru M was saying it is a shame that the
conduct of the people actually enforcing the tsunami was so bad and so cruel
that it was giving the ruling party a bad name! (Notes, 12 July 2005)
The sentiment that the principles behind Operation Murambatsvina
were beneficial, and that it was making the streets cleaner and
safer, was one that I heard frequently both in Harare’s low-density
southern suburbs, and in high-density areas like Chitungwiza.
49 In late June 2005 I was looking for a small house to rent in Harare’s poorer southern low-
density suburbs, an endeavour I postponed when it became clear that the crisis had produced
a massive shortage of housing. At almost every property I visited, landlords were poring over
faded official council planning documents or rummaging through old files to locate plans,
in order to reassure themselves that if the tsunami arrived at their door they would be able
to demonstrate the legality of their structures.
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This was particularly the case in the early weeks of the operation,
when informal markets in the city centre were the main target.
Initially, many people across Harare seemed to agree with the views
of government officials. According to Phillip Chidavaenzi, ‘when
the authorities in Harare . . . launched an unprecedented clean-up
campaign – presumably meant to restore order in the former “Sunshine
City” – residents at first welcomed the manoeuvre, until it assumed a
sinister dimension that has led people to revise the true motive behind
the campaign’.50 If the clearances of Harare’s CBD areas elicited initial
feelings of support from many, for people directly affected in Hatfield,
Chitungwiza and elsewhere whom I spoke to, these sentiments changed
when the operation began to target ‘illegal structures’ in residential
areas.51
Unsurprisingly, government newspapers highlighted the benefits of
the operation. On the 22 June 2005, The Herald reported that criminal
activities in Harare’s CBD had fallen by 16 per cent in the previous
month.52 And the Daily Mirror commented that ‘the city council
deserves a pat on the shoulder. The once filthy and unkempt city is on
the path of retaining its status as the “sunshine city” within a short and
a hectic period of clean up’.53 Similarly, for the Sunday Mail ‘positive
results have begun to emerge with the restoration of orderliness in
the major urban centres which had become havens of lawlessness in
the past few years’, and ‘although there are divergent views over the
manner in which the operation is being carried out and although many
people have lost their homes, the ultimate goal of the exercise has been
widely accepted as noble’.54 Similarly, despite shrill suggestions that
the operation had split the ruling party, many ZANU PF politicians
publicly indicated their support for the exercise.55
50Daily Mirror, 27 May 2005.
51There were also obvious class dimensions to divergent attitudes to Operation
Murambatsvina. When I asked a Budiriro resident working at Harare municipal offices
whether she or her family had been affected by the tsunami, she replied gruffly: ‘No, we
don’t have those illegal structures’ (Notes, 14 July 2005). The curtness of her response, and
the sentiments expressed by others (such as those in Waterfalls above) about the benefits of
the operation, suggest that among some middle-class people there was, and perhaps still is,
sympathy with the ‘prevalent official ideology of a planned and modern urban environment’
which Potts (2006a: 276, fn. 14; see also Potts 2006b) argues was ‘one of the factors
underlying the instigation of Operation Murambatsvina’.
52According to Harare’s police spokesperson, ‘Cases of theft, theft from motor vehicles and
house breaking among others have gone down by half compared to those we recorded during
the same period last year’, The Herald, 22 June 2005.
53Daily Mirror, 22 June 2005. Expressing a sentiment that lucidly illustrates how
Murambatsvina could resonate with aspirations to respectability and moral propriety, the
writer went further, arguing that the clean-up should also be turned to ‘the issue of dressing,
especially of our women folk’, suggesting that ‘something with a name like Operation Kupfeka
Kunehunhu [literally, operation dressing decently] will definitely be most welcome’. ‘As the
country is slowly retaining its identity,’ the writer concluded ‘inhabitants too have to have an
identity’.
54 ‘Clean-up exercise bears fruit’, Sunday Mail 26 June 2005.
55For example: ‘Clean up splits ZANU PF’, The Standard, 19 June 2005; also ‘Mbalekwa
quits over Murambatsvina as Zanu PF cracks deepen’, Zimbabwe Independent, 1 July 2005.
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Letters in the government press also indicated how the operation
could appeal to the particular concerns of different urban residents.
One ‘concerned citizen’ in the capital ‘hailed the City of Harare
and the ZRP for . . . making Harare look like what it used to be’
and in particular, for ‘restricting commuter omnibuses to designated
areas’ as ‘those people’ were a ‘menace’ and ‘a law unto themselves’
in the city centre. He/she also urged the council to extend the
operation to ‘timely and regular removal of garbage from residential
areas’ and expressed concern about the ‘very unsightly’ rubble from
demolished ‘illegal structures’.56 On 22 June 2005, the Bulawayo
Chronicle published similar letters of support. One applauded the
‘clean up campaign against illegal housing co-operatives which were
building houses without approval’, adding that ‘of special concern’
was the common occurrence of private developers speculating on
housing stands, thereby raising prices in a way which was ‘tantamount
to daylight robbery’. Another letter, signed ‘Homeless’, commended
the government’s commitment ‘to restoring order in cities’, but also
highlighted the plight of civil servants and teachers made homeless by
the demolitions, urging the authorities to ‘allow school development
committees in urban areas to build houses for teachers like their
counterparts in rural areas’. Another Bulawayo resident was ‘amazed
to see the black market raising its ugly head again at Renkini long
distance bus terminus’, blaming retailers for promoting the ‘barbaric’
black market by selling sugar in 20kg lots ‘using the back door’.
Of course, such letters in the government press are not necessarily
representative of the broader public mood, and it seems unlikely
that simplistic statements of open support for the operation were
widely appreciated by the newly destitute across high-density and
peri-urban areas in the country, or the many, such as Tanaka, who
lost a vital source of income through the destruction of rent-raising
backyard shacks (Potts 2006a: 286 and 288).57 Nevertheless, my own
encounters in Chitungwiza, Hatfield and Masvingo do suggest that
some of the diversity of issues raised by such letters – such as the
conduct of commuter minibuses, the vagaries of the black market,
and the lack of housing for teachers – do resonate intimately with the
Walter Mzembi, the new Masvingo South MP, told Parliament that the operation was ‘long
overdue’, adding that ‘the informal sector is an important source of revenue in Zimbabwe
[and] there is need to reorganize it so as to create a taxable base’, Daily Mirror, 22 June 2005;
and David Karimanzira, Governor of Harare Province, announced his support in The Herald
on 1 July 2005.
56Sunday Mail, 26 June 2005.
57Of course the independent press featured numerous letters from residents deploring
Operation Murambatsvina. For just a few examples, see: ‘A clear crime against humanity –
open letter from David Coltart’, by D. Coltart, MDC MP, The Zimbabwean, 24–30 June
2005; ‘Spare a thought for the poor’, by ‘Very Worried, Harare’, The Standard, 19 June 2005;
‘Have mercy on them’, by Fr Oskar Wermter SJ, Harare, The Independent, 24 June 2005;
‘Pogrom must never be forgotten’, by ‘Umbrage, Harare’, The Independent,
24 June 2005; ‘Enough fuel to descend on the innocent’, by ‘VeMaromo, Harare’, The
Independent, 24 June 2005.
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daily trials and tribulations of many ordinary urban residents across
high- and low-density areas, including, perhaps more so, those directly
affected by the tsunami in poorer areas dominated by the working and
informally employed classes, for whom these particular complaints have
much more daily salience than for the wealth-cushioned residents of
Harare’s northern suburbs. Indeed the issues raised by letters in this
vein illustrate how official justifications for the operation could be
commensurable with the experiences and aspirations of the poorer,
higher-density residents most affected by it. As has become much
clearer recently, amid rapidly declining basic public services – and
particularly, for example, in the rising numbers of cholera deaths in
high-density areas due to massively deteriorating water and sewerage
systems58 – the poor often have much more at stake in issues of service
provision, urban planning and ‘order’ to which official justifications
of Murambatsvina appealed, than do the wealthier residents of low-
density areas. In August 2008, one long-term resident of Chitungwisa
even lamented that Operation Murambatsvina had not delivered on
its official promises, as that might have helped prevent rising cholera
deaths.59
For many older residents the tsunami triggered memories of
past evictions and ‘slum clearances’ carried out by the Rhodesian
government in Mufakose and other high-density areas in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. One old woman, a former resident of Mufakose now
living in Hatfield, described how ‘this is not new for us, it happened to
us when we were young in Mufakose, in our father’s house’, stressing
that ‘it was good because the streets were clean, and they built markets
for people to sell their things’ (Notes, 16 June 2005). Often the
tsunami also invoked memories of a later, post-independence period
of enforcement of urban planning regulations, before the late 1990s
heralded increasing official tolerance towards the ‘informalization of
the economy and environment’ (Potts 2006a: 287). For one mupostori
(member of the apostolic church) living in Unit H in Chitungwiza,
the operation rekindled positive memories of the early 1990s, when
the council demolished older housing in the area and replaced it with
new, affordable ‘rent to buy’ core houses, which residents were then
permitted to extend, subject to compliance with planning regulations.60
58Chitungwiza, Glen View and Budiriro have been particularly badly affected; see, for
example, Combined Harare Resident’s Association, ‘Cholera outbreaks: residents cannot
continue to suffer’, 12 September 2008, 〈http://www.chra.co.zw/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=94&Itemid=37〉, accessed 15 December 2008; also ‘Zimbabwe:
cholera outbreak threatens to become endemic’, IRIN News, 20 October 2008,
〈http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=81009〉, accessed 15 December 2008;
‘Cholera spreads in Harare claiming more lives’, The Zimbabwean, 4 November 2008.
59 ‘Dai Operation Murambatsvina yakaitwa nemazvo, sekudare, vana vedu vangadai vasiri
kufa nemanyoka nhasi. Hurumende haina marii yekutenga mushonga yekucleana mvura’ – ‘If
Operation Murambatsvina had been done properly, like in the past, our children wouldn’t
be dying of diarrhoea today. The government has no money to buy chemicals to clean the
water’ (Notes, 21 August 2008).
60As he put it, ‘Kanzuru payakaita the same kind of operation gore re1993, pavakapunza
dzimba dzedu, takagara mumatemporary accommodation, vachitivakira dzimba dzitsva
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Such accounts mirror those academic analyses (Potts 2006a
and 2006b; Dorman 2007; Mlambo 2008) that have considered
Murambatsvina in terms of a longer durée of Zimbabwean urban
history, indicating that in many respects the exercise was not
particularly novel in either form or manner, however unprecedented
in terms of ‘scale and thoroughness’ (Potts 2006a: 276, fn. 14) it
clearly was.61 As Potts (2006a: 284) has pointed out, Zimbabwe was in
many ways exceptional across sub-Saharan Africa in that a very small
percentage of its urban population lived in the ‘slums’ common to cities
in other developing countries. The reason for this, Potts explains,
is very simple: true squatters (in the tenurial sense) have nearly always been
cleared away since (and, of course, before) independence; the development
of large-scale major settlements of this type was not allowed. No other
African country has maintained such continuity of official resistance to such
settlements. (Potts 2006a: 284)
Such a longer, historical view reiterates that in many ways Operation
Murambatsvina was not unprecedented. Such historical precedents
explain how the government’s appeals to order and planning could
be salient and recognizable to many people in both high- and low-
density areas. If Murambatsvina ‘did not represent a true change of
commitment to “order” by many in the government’ (Potts 2006a:
276 fn 14), neither was that commitment to ‘order’ unrecognizable
to the widespread urban populations which the operation directly
or indirectly affected.62 Therefore, while firmly castigating ZANU
PF incompetence (besides any political motives), Punungwe of the
independent The Standard acknowledged the operation ‘may have
had good intentions’.63 Even Bill Saidi, veteran journalist and former
editor of the banned Daily News, acknowledged that while the ‘orgy of
destruction’ demonstrated that ‘the most illegal structure today is the
dzataizobadara se“rent to buy”’ – ‘When the council did the same operation in 1993, when
they destroyed our houses, we lived in temporary accommodation, whilst they were building
our new “rent to buy” houses’ (Notes, 30 July 2005).
61Especially as it came after nearly a decade of increasing tolerance towards informal
housing and the spread of ‘unplanned’ backyard shacks across low-, medium- and high-
density areas, and in the recent context of a worsening economic climate in which 70 per
cent of the population was relying on the informal economy for subsistence and livelihoods.
62Even the ‘misplaced’ emphasis of the international media upon the minority of cases
when ‘legal’ buildings were being destroyed may have represented not only ‘a lack of
appreciation that some element of “illegality” . . . is ubiquitous in low-income housing
in . . . developing countries’, but also ‘a view that poor, “shanty” housing . . . somehow,
regrettably, deserves demolition’ (Potts 2006a: 275–6). As Potts points out, this view ‘assumes
that the occupants had some reasonable alternative and/or that their rights and needs
are less important than those in legal houses’, yet not only does it awkwardly replicate
official statements – so weakening ‘the logic of the opposition to the campaign’ (Potts 2006a:
276) – but it also reverberates with the view that the aim of ‘restoring order’ was in principle
legitimate, even if the execution of the programme was often experienced as a brutal exercise
of power, or if these ‘admirable’ aims disguised other, more sinister political motives.
63The Standard, 3 July 2005.
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government’, in principle ‘the clean up of central business district made
eminent sense’ as ‘Harare had become a veritable dump’.64
Regardless, then, of the extent to which the government was able
to persuasively expound the legitimacy of its intentions,65 the logic
of ‘restoring order’ and formal planning was recognizable and salient
to many victims of the campaign, resonating both with varying,
well-engrained, older aspirations to respectability and propriety (cf.
Scarnecchia 1999; West 2002; Maxwell 2006), and memories of
past ‘slum clearances’ and more stringent enforcement of planning
regulations (Potts 2006a and 2006b; Dorman 2007; Mlambo 2008).
Otherwise, the images of people dusting off old planning documents
or minutely discussing past evictions, or what constitutes an illegal
structure, would not make any sense at all. Moreover, the effect of
this ‘planning’ aspect of the operation was reflected in the common
sight of people destroying their own ‘illegal structures’ ahead of the
arrival of council officials; in anticipation of the tsunami. Most of
all, the point is made simply by the fact that in many areas ruined
backyard shacks, tuckshops and other demolished ‘illegal’ structures
have been neither rebuilt nor repaired.66 With the exception of the
‘resilient urbanites’ of Mbare and Highfields, whom Mujere observed
beginning to reconstruct shacks in late 2007 for want of income or
shelter (Mujere 2007: 16), and notwithstanding dramatic shortages in
financing and materials, few people, I suspect, would be likely to simply
rebuild expensive backyard cottages unless they could do so with the
sense of security that being ‘on a plan’ offers.
It seems Chombo’s warnings to ‘observe proper development
procedures’ have been taken seriously.67 Of course, in the absence
of formal employment, black market activities re-emerged almost
immediately (Bratton and Masunungure 2006: 38), but, apart from
the few traders allocated stands in rebuilt council markets,68 most
have continued ‘playing hide and seek with municipal police’.69 Both
news reports later in the year,70 and the account of the unfortunate
vendor forced to labour on a vice-presidential farm, illustrate that the
operation was ‘not a once-off exercise but a sustained’ effort, as Sekesai
Makwavarara had indeed warned in her opening announcement of
64Zimbabwe Independent, 24 June 2005.
65As Potts suggests, both the surprise and lack of preparation expressed by the government
at the ‘barrage of criticism it deservedly received from much of the world’ (for example,
‘Regime determined to shoot itself in the foot’, Zimbabwe Independent, 8 July 2005) and
the fact that the government’s figures of the numbers of people affected ‘were not a gross
underestimate (as might have been expected given the level of international outcry) may ‘have
reflected a belief in the “legitimacy” of the operation and thus that there was no reason to hide
anything’ (Potts 2006a: 276).
66See also SPT 2006.
67Sunday Mail, 19 June 2005.
68These were in some cases vetted by the police. The Herald, 22 June 2005.
69Daily Mirror, 15 November 2005; see also 16 September 2005 and Mujere 2007: 14–16.
70For example, ‘Murambatsvina strikes again’, The Standard, 18 September 2005; and ‘250
squatters made “homeless” again’, Zimbabwe Independent, 18 November 2005.
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the operation on 19 May.71 Evidently, the exercise was not just, in
Chombo’s words, a ‘political gimmick’ and the government was indeed,
‘serious in what it says’.72
RUMOURS AND UNCERTAINTY
If Operation Murambatsvina was experienced in terms of a tension
between the resonances of official appeals to ‘planning’ and its
demonstration of ZANU PF’s ability to deploy ‘state power’ ruthlessly,
and as it chose, then perhaps it was the ambiguity and uncertainty
provoked by this ‘tension’ which resulted in the extraordinary range
of explanations, ‘hidden’ agendas and rumours which were circulating
at that time. I have already mentioned some of these – that the
initial operation was a means of emptying the city-centre streets and
neutralizing a possible eruption of public discontent at worsening
economic hardships; or a form of punishment against urban opposition
supporters; or a means of electoral manipulation by forcing dramatic
demographic change. Other suggestions included that the operation
was the result of internal power struggles within the ruling party; or
a means of overcoming labour shortages on resettled farms; or a means
of centralizing power over urban areas and bypassing troublesome
but elected urban councils (Ndlovu 2005). Other speculations focused
on how the clearances affected war-veteran-led housing projects,
suggesting that the aim was to ‘clip the wings’ of troublesome veterans,
whose political uses as violent campaigners had been surpassed by the
new availability of the youth militia.73 Others focused on economic
reasons: that the clearances of flea markets and street vendors were
about reasserting central government (and ZANU PF) influence over
the burgeoning, non-tax-paying informal economy. Rumours circulated
that the operation derived from the growing ambitions of the Reserve
Bank and ZIMRA74 to exert more control over black market trading in
scarce foreign currency. Rumours also later emerged about Operation
Garikai: that new housing projects replacing demolished homes opened
up new forms of political patronage to be exploited by the ruling
party.75
Of course, discussion of ‘rumours’ and ‘hidden agendas’ provokes
a somewhat circular scenario; uncertainty about the intentions behind
the operation may have been reflected in this plethora of rumours, but
71Makwavarara’s opening speech was reported in the Saturday Herald, 28 May 2005.
For text see SPT 2005, Appendix 2.
72Daily Mirror, 15 November 2005.
73ZHR NGO Forum 2005a: 18.
74Zimbabwe Revenue Authority.
75Corruption scandals surrounding the allocation of Garikai stands suggest there may be
something to this. Amnesty International claims that 20 per cent of houses built under Garikai
‘were earmarked for civil servants, police and soldiers’ (see Amnesty International 2007: 287).
See also ‘Chombo owns up to “Garikai” corruption’, The Standard, 19 March 2006; ‘Chefs
grab “Garikai” houses’, The Standard, 5 February 2006; also SPT 2006: 8.
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the barrage of different, conflicting rumours must have simultaneously
reinforced the sense of ambiguity, uncertainty and anxiety about
what the purpose of the tsunami was. The array of differing official
explanations may have contributed to the plethora of rumours about the
possible ‘hidden’ political agendas behind the operation.76 But these
varying official explanations did tend to emphasize those aspects of the
operation which could resonate with memories of past clearances and
differing aspirations to respectability, as well as the more immediate,
daily tribulations of urban residents.77
This occasional congruence of appeal, and the fact that many
rumours engaged finely with, even as they twisted, official explanations,
suggest it is probably mistaken to make a clear distinction between
‘official reasons’ for the operation and an alternative, rumour-based
discourse of ‘hidden’ political agendas. Rather, it is precisely in the
tension between official reasons and ‘hidden’ agendas – the tension
between the demonstration of state power, and the resonances of
official appeals to ‘order’ – that the political advantages for the ruling
elite become most apparent. This is not to suggest that there was
necessarily a ‘master plan’ to promote this ambiguous uncertainty.78
Rather, I suspect that what actually happened is that the way the
tsunami manifested itself in particular places and moments was a
function of the complex multiplicity of different agendas located at
different points in council, government and ruling party hierarchies.
In other words, for some bashing troublesome war vets was important,
for others punishing MDC voters or preventing a threatening public
outpouring of discontent took priority, while for frustrated council
planners the opportunity to reinforce bye-laws was too good to
miss, ZIMRA officials saw a chance to raise scarce foreign currency,
and so on.
76Despite Ignatius Chombo’s denial of any ‘political gimmick’ behind the exercise, officials
‘advanced a whole miscellany of reasons’ for the operation, which were ‘confusing and
occasionally at variance with each other’, ZHR NGO Forum 2005a: ii and 16.
77Like restoring the capital’s ‘sunshine status’, undermining an aggressive black market,
improving commuter transport, reducing crime, and enforcing planning regulations that
would improve housing, ensure urban sanitation and protect public health, and so on.
78One NGO report (ZHR NGO Forum 2005a) oddly suggested the operation was
provoked by the government’s need to recapture ‘international respectability’ and the ‘re-
engagement of the international community’. Realizing that this required a ‘reversal of its
whole style of governing, adherence to the rule of law, an end to political violence and
repression, opening of the press and media space, and a cessation of all interference with
citizens’ basic freedoms’, the Zimbabwean government also recognized, according to this
explanation, that ‘the greatest risk to repressive governments comes when they seek to
liberalize’. Hence Operation Murambatsvina was supposed to ‘eliminate’ and ‘neutralize’ the
political threats posed by a large, discontented urban population, ahead of reform efforts
intended to ‘overcome its international political and economic isolation’. While with hindsight
it seems extraordinary to argue that Murambatsvina was part of a larger plan aimed at political
reform (and recent events in Zimbabwe have shown that nothing like this has materialized at
all) in a sense this theory itself illustrates the difficulties that people and organizations had
in giving meaning to the complicated events of May–July 2005 as they unfolded, and the
persuasiveness of a common tendency to attribute them to a single, conscious and intentional
kind of political agency on the part of the ruling party.
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The point here is not to uncover the multiple or ‘real’ origins of
the operation but to explore the political affects of the way it was
experienced. Key to this is separating intention from political affect.
The tension between the resonances of official appeals to planning and
the spectacle of state power deployed at ZANU PF’s whim was not
necessarily the result of any particular intentions.79 In order to elaborate
what I mean, I turn briefly to a master writer on political affect, Achilles
Mbembe. In On the Postcolony, Mbembe (2001) discusses the way in
which the vulgar excesses of ruling elites in Cameroon are represented
and satirized in newspaper cartoons. Mbembe questions the extent to
which such satire, and the laughter it can provoke, really represents a
‘speaking back’ to power or a form of ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 1985
and 1990). In his words,
The laughter of those crushed endeavours to respond, striving to humiliate
‘the thing’ utterly. But this second violence, far from signing the ‘thing’ in
death, rather intensifies its presence by enclosing the subject in a mixture
of fascination and dread . . . to the extent that it is the autocrat who offers
speech, commands what is listened to and what is written, and fills the space
to the point of still being talked of even as the act of creation is claiming to
debase him. (Mbembe 2001: 165)
This is, as reviewers have noted, a profoundly pessimistic view, which
deploys something akin to Bakhtin’s carnivalesque ‘baroque practices’
yet rejects any notion of ‘subalternity as resistance’, favouring instead
a vision of all encompassing power in order to explain the ‘African
potentate’s long tenure’ (Adeeko 2002; Weate 2003: 36). For Mbembe,
post-coloniality is better understood not as a relationship of resistance
or of collaboration, but as one of ‘conviviality’, which inscribes ‘the
dominant and the dominated within the same episteme’ (Mbembe
2001: 110). As some commentators have noted, this is a distinctly
Hegelian scheme (Adeeko 2002), yet the importance of Mbembe’s
approach lies in its ‘hybrid amalgam of poststructuralist semiotics and
existential phenomenology’, aligned ‘at some point between concrete
lived experience and economies of the sign’ (Weate 2003: 28–9).
For Mbembe, the satirical cartoons that attempt to ridicule and thus
debase the vulgar excesses of the political elite are ‘an integral part
of the stylistics of power’ (2001: 115) which do not check the power
of the ‘elite’ so much as reinforce their omnipotent presence. What
I want to suggest, therefore, is that the plethora of rumours –what
Ellis (1989) called ‘pavement radio’ –which circulated on the streets
and sometimes in newspapers, about the ‘true’ intentions and ‘hidden’
political agendas that lay behind OperationMurambatsvina act in a way
similar to Mbembe’s cartoons, reinforcing the omnipotent presence
of the ruling party elite, and its ability to deploy devastating ‘state
power’ at will. While White’s Speaking With Vampires (2000: 312)
79Although I suspect some of ZANU PF’s sharper political minds must have been
aware of it.
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showed how ‘stories and rumours . . . mark ways to talk about conflicts
and contradictions that gave them meaning and power’, Mbembe’s
text points the way towards ‘recontextualizing’ rumour ‘as a quasi-
material substance, as a hinge between the world of concepts and
the world of bodily experience’ (Weate 2003: 40). Rumours then,
like cartoons, not only carry or reveal a complexity of meanings;
they can have duplicitous political affects. In this sense, the popular
dubbing of Operation Murambatsvina as Zimbabwe’s tsunami not only
reflects attempts to make sense of its perceived arbitrariness in terms
which resonate internationally, and subvert official justifications for the
operation; it also simultaneously reifies the very powerful presence of
the ruling party and its ability to deploy force ruthlessly, as it chooses.80
But although there is something important in Mbembe’s argument
about the way cartoons, and in this case rumours, are part of the
‘stylistics of power’,81 I am also suspicious of the pessimism of
Mbembe’s motif of ‘all encompassing power’. Official justifications for
Operation Murambatsvina did resonate with some people’s sensibilities
about good governance – and a bureaucratically functional ‘state’ – even
if those same people did not necessarily approve of the operation.
Such sensibilities do matter to the ruling party. Officials were keen
to demonstrate the benign and ‘proper’ motives that lay behind
the operation, even as ZANU PF, no doubt, absorbed the political
advantages of demonstrating, again, its ability to deploy ruthless ‘state
power’ as it chooses. That is surely why the government welcomed
and facilitated the UN special envoy’s visit to assess the impact
of the operation.82 And when her report (Tibaijuka 2005) fiercely
denigrated it, the government responded by publishing an extremely
lengthy, step-by-step refutation of the UN’s findings (Government of
Zimbabwe 2005). In sum, while the ‘spectacle’ of the violence of the
clearances suited ZANU PF in terms of Mbembe’s ‘stylistics of power’
(as a reification of its omni-powerful presence), the government also
craved a kind of legitimacy which manifested itself in its attempts to
appeal to (some) people’s aspirations towards good governance and
a functioning, bureaucratic state. And it is for this reason that the
ambiguity and uncertainty of the tension between ‘luck and planning’,
the demonstration of force and the resonances of official appeals to
80Perhaps it is for this reason that two state agents were so amused when I responded
‘You mean the tsunami!’ when I was asked for my views on Operation Murambatsvina,
during a two-hour security clearance interview with members of the ‘President’s Office’ in
August 2005.
81 In particular, I am seduced by the notion that ‘stateness’ operates and is constantly
being reimagined and reproduced in discourses and practices ‘on the margins’ (Tsing 1994;
Das and Poole 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 2001) at the level of rumours and back street
conversations.
82At the time there were signs that the government attempted to ‘steer’ the UN Envoy’s
investigations through its facilitation of the visit. This itself produced a variety of rumours:
for example, that the suddenly disappearing queues for buses, and the temporary lifting of
bans on private car owners providing transport for commuters, were aimed at promoting
a rosier picture of the daily struggles of ordinary people in the capital (Notes, 6 July 2005).
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the restoration of ‘order’, were of such political advantage to the ruling
party.
In many ways, what I am describing here is not unique to post-
colonial Zimbabwe; indeed my theoretical framework is part of a
broader trend in political anthropology which has explored the interplay
of Foucauldian and Gramscian notions of power and hegemony,
governance and sovereignty; the role of political affect (Deleuze and
Guattari 2004); and the importance of the margins in the ongoing
process of the construction of the state (Hansen and Steputtat 2001;
Tsing 1994; Das and Poole 2004). In her fascinating analysis of ‘state
rituals’, ‘public statism’ and the production of ‘civil society’ in Turkey,
Navaro-Yashin (2002: 117–54) comes to the following conclusion,
which I think has significant echoes in what I have been discussing.
Statism, then, persists through both repressive and productive mechanisms
of power, not only one or the other as temporarily privileged by Michel
Foucault. There is a level of agency and spontaneity among the so-called
people, a willing initiative to stand for the state. The difference between
the two, spontaneity and enforcement, is blurred. It is perhaps within this
blurred zone that power so effectively operates (and where it is regenerated)
in contemporary Turkey and the statist world we live in today. (Navaro-
Yashin 2002: 154)
In many ways this ‘blurring’ of ‘spontaneity and enforcement’,
between ‘repressive and productive mechanisms of power’, mirrors
the ambiguity and uncertainty of the tension between a display of
force and the appeal to ‘planning’ that I have focused on here.
But one last issue still needs to be resolved. If this very tension
was of such political advantage to the ruling elite, as ‘the blurred
zone’ where ‘power so effectively operates’, what is left of ‘resistance’
and ‘agency’? Does this analysis not merely repeat or indeed further
reinforce Mbembe’s bleak picture of ‘all encompassing power’? I am
not comfortable with that image. If rumours are the site of the
reinforcement of a particular mechanism of ‘state power’, if rumours
that seek to subvert or reveal the truth behind official representations
actually duplicitously and treacherously reify the omnipotent presence
they seek to undermine, then surely this can work both ways. There
must always remain the possibility that rumours can subvert the other,
‘productive aspect of power’, which appeals to or resonates with some
people’s aspirations to good governance and a functioning state. The
Zimbabwean government was very keen to demonstrate the legitimacy
of its intentions, and there were indications of official uneasiness at
some of the rumours circulating about the ‘hidden agendas’ behind
the operation. This was perhaps best revealed by another rumour
circulating in June 2005 – that one could be arrested for referring to
Murambatsvina as the tsunami. One man was allegedly ‘beaten and
left for dead by five soldiers’ for exactly that.83 Later, similar rumours
83See ZHR NGO Forum 2005c.
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emerged that a common derogatory reference to poor-quality Chinese
goods (which have in recent years littered Zimbabwean markets) as
zhingzhong was also an arrestable offence.84 Of course the existence
of such ‘counter-rumours’ can be taken to demonstrate not only the
insecurity of officials, but also, again, a kind of reinforcement of ZANU
PF’s powerful presence. In a way, the circular nature of this argument
in itself represents exactly the ambiguous nature of rumours that I am
highlighting.
The issue of mazhingzhong leads me to a final rumour about the
‘hidden’ political intentions behind Operation Murambatsvina, which
I have not yet mentioned. According to this rumour, the attack
upon informal traders was ‘nothing but a shameless attempt by the
government to protect Chinese traders’, who had allegedly ‘complained
to President Mugabe that the flea markets were taking away a huge
chunk of their business’.85 Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC leader, reportedly
said ‘the country has been mortgaged to the Chinese . . . how can we
violently remove Zimbabweans from our flea markets to make way
for the Chinese? The majority of Zimbabweans depend on informal
trade to feed, clothe, and educate their families’.86 With the high
profile being given at that particular moment to the government’s
‘Look East Policy’ as a means of solving Zimbabwe’s fiscal crisis,87
it is not surprising that widespread, popular references to Chinese
products as mazhingzhong were not well appreciated, particularly given
the disturbing racial undertones of some such references.88
Indeed, of all the rumours that I have discussed, the suggestion
that the ‘real’ intention of the clearances was to ‘make space’ in
local markets for Chinese traders had perhaps the greatest potential to
provoke official uneasiness, because it strikes so hard at the core of what
Ranka Primorac (2005: 2) has called Zimbabwe’s ‘whole, coherent
and self-perpetuating’ post-colonial ‘master fiction’, in which the ruling
party, war veterans and particularly President Mugabe himself are
represented as the heroic defenders of Zimbabwean sovereignty against
foreign interference and neo-colonialism (see also Ranger 2004a). The
subversive potential of this rumour is perhaps best demonstrated by the
fact that, a year later, public anger at the effects of unfettered Chinese
84This was also reported in the media – for example, ‘Zimbabwe: Look East
policy failing; Mugabe’s drive to win wealthy and uncritical friends in East Asia
does little to rescue the economy’, Africa Reports No. 42, 27 September 2005,
〈http://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=253560&apc_state=heniacr2005〉, accessed 15 December
2008.
85 ‘Chinese inflict huge blow on struggling Zimbabwean industries’, Zim Online (SA), 23
May 2005.
86 ‘Zimbabwe’s new colonialists: Mugabe begins selling off his country to curry favour with
the Chinese’, The Weekly Standard, 25 May 2005.
87For example, Daily Mirror, 18 May 2005; The Herald, 25 May 2005.
88For example, one commentator writing in The Zimbabwean asked ‘Did the Heroes die
so that these horrible little Zhing Zhong’s could run rampant over our people, shout their
strange language in our ears, and cast their cheap rubbish in our faces? I don’t think so.’
The Zimbabwean, 11 August 2005.
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trade in Zimbabwe (and the poor quality of some Chinese imports)
had reached such a crescendo that ZANU PF’s politburo had to take
note. As one politburo member put it, ‘although the Chinese are our
friends, they are making the people hate the government’.89 ZANU
PF’s newspaper, The Voice, reported that Vice-President Mujuru
informed the politburo that ‘all Chinese deals would now have to
be “evaluated”’.90 Clearly, the idea that the government was ‘selling
out’ to the Chinese was far too disconcerting to be simply ignored,
and the ‘counter-rumour’ that one could be arrested for making such
derogatory remarks was more than simply ‘an integral part of the
stylistics of power’ as Mbembe’s analysis might have us think. Rather,
I suggest, it reflected genuine concern about the threat posed by this
rumour.
Back in July 2005, intrigued by the idea that police might be arresting
people for referring to Chinese goods as mazhingzhong (which was
extremely common), I took an opportunity one Friday, when my car
broke down in central Harare, to see if there was any truth in it (Notes,
16 July 2005). Faulty part in hand, I arrived at the auto repair shop to
find a policeman involved in a light-hearted conversation with a shop
attendant. Complaining about having to report for duty, he exclaimed
that ‘It is a nuisance having to do these roadblocks every day!’ Sensing
the jovial mood, I joked in Shona, ‘So even the police get bored with
roadblocks, because they really trouble us!’ The policeman laughed and
then asked why I had come into the shop. I explained I had come
to replace a faulty part for my car: ‘I was sold this condenser but it
doesn’t work. I was sold this zhingzhong.’ Laughing at my audacity, the
policemen warned: ‘You could be arrested for saying that!’ Pushing the
point, I asked, ‘Are you going to arrest me now?’ It was all a joke and
I was not arrested, but I did not push the matter further, sensing I might
have reached the boundary.
Later I reflected on this event. Contrary to another less jovial
moment at a roadblock a few weeks earlier (Notes, 6 July 2005),
when an angry policeman handed my companion an on-the-spot fine
for ‘being uncooperative’, the policeman in the shop seemed to have
been in a good mood. The comparison of these events illustrates
perfectly the larger argument of Das and Poole’s book (2004), that
‘the entirety of the state is a margin’ (Asad 2004: 287), and that it is
exactly on these all-pervasive but necessarily ambiguous and uncertain
‘margins’ that unstable ‘state power’ has constantly to be re-established.
The incident with the jovial policeman in the shop laughing at my
reference to zhingzhong suggests that if the rumours that circulated
about Operation Murambatsvina are an example of the constant
89Adding that ‘it was “rather unfair” for them to provide quality services and goods to
Western countries “at our expense”’, The Standard, 22 October 2006.
90Cited in The Standard, 22 October 2006. According to The Standard, ‘the fallout over
trading with China has already claimed the scalp of Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to China and
former Mugabe minder, Chris Mutsvangwa, who is reported to be on his way out of the
diplomatic service’.
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re-making of ‘stateness’ on the margins, then not only can the uncertain
ambiguity of such rumours reinforce the omnipotent presence of the
‘arbitrary’ ‘state power’ available to a ruling elite, but they can also
illustrate the omnipresence of its fundamental insecurity.
CONCLUSIONS
However much the ‘crash’ (Tibaijuka 2005: 1) of Murambatsvina
took people by surprise, there was actually little that was particularly
unprecedented about the ruling party’s impulse to launch such
an unexpected operation. Indeed, since the late 1990s, perhaps
beginning with the war veteran pay-offs in 1997, and certainly
with fast-track land reform in 2000, launching the unexpected has
almost become a government ‘trademark’ in itself. Although always
provoking accusations about the lack of proper government ‘planning’
or indeed ‘fiscal discipline’, such programmes have never operated
entirely outside the scope of state planning departments, and often,
through time, have witnessed a kind of reassertion of centralized
state institutions. The fast-track land reform programme is a good
example. While some commentators noted how the land ‘invasions’ of
2000–1 provoked the ‘strange spectacle [of] a government effectively
unravelling its own state with great vigour’ (Alexander 2003: 114),
others charted a move from ‘jambanja to planning’ (Chaumbe et al.
2003) that amounted to a ‘reassertion of technocracy’ amidst the
‘new politics and new livelihoods’ that emerged on the back of
profound agrarian change. Similarly, assaults by war veterans on
local authorities in Matabeleland and Midlands in 2001 provided an
(imperfect) cover for the re-articulation, at district and provincial levels,
of a highly centralized authority in which state and party structures
were increasingly conflated (McGregor 2002). Likewise Operation
Murambatsvina – and its successor Operation Garikai – continue an
established pattern of inclusion and exclusion (Dorman 2003) which
involves, as the contours of citizenship are redefined, both the
dismantling or bypassing of local state institutions and their subsequent
reassertion in more centralized and politicized forms.
These issues remain controversial and academic debates continue
to focus on whether the emergence of ‘authoritarian nationalism’
(Hammer and Raftopoulos 2003) in Zimbabwe represents a retreat
from, exhaustion by (Bond and Manyanya 2003; Campbell 2003),
or redefinition of (Worby 2003: 68) the ‘modern’, ‘developmental’,
post-colonial state in favour of a renewed anti-colonial focus on
sovereignty and self-determination. This article has not entered into
this broader debate about Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis. Engaging with
recent anthropological discussions of ‘the state’ as it appears at the
margins, I have sought to move beyond what has been increasingly
recognized as an overly simplistic distinction between either resistance
to, or complicity with any dominant ‘power’. Deploying Mbembe’s
notion of the conviviality of relations between the ‘powerful and
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the powerless’ – a relationship defined neither by collaboration nor
resistance – yet seeking to avoid his pessimistic vision of all-persuasive,
all-complicit, all-encompassing power, I have argued that regardless of
any apparently hegemonic control of the media, and other symbolic,
social and material resources, a ruling entity must constantly engage
with those discourses and rumours that occur on its multiple margins.
In participating in these ongoing and incomplete re-imaginings, ruling
potentates do not necessarily control the terms of the debates and
rumours in which they are implicated, regardless of how hard they
may try to do so. Indeed such attempts can offer glimpses into the
substantial insecurity – or even emptiness (Taussig 1992) – that can lie
at the centre; so that rumours about people being arrested for using the
word tsunami to describe Operation Murambatsvina, or for referring to
cheap Chinese imports as zhingzhong, reveal something of the tenuous
position of elites, even as the same rumours may also reify their
omnipotent presence. Just as, on a material level, scholars of political
economy have often emphasized that ‘the exercise of government in
all modern states entails the articulation of a form of pastoral care
with sovereign power’ (Hammer 2003: 130–1; Dean 2001: 53), so too
are ruling ‘elites’ holding the reins at the ‘centre’ inevitably engaged
in discourses and rumours on the omnipresent ‘margins’, the terms of
which can often, try as they might, lie outside their grip.
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ABSTRACT
Using ethnographic material alongside newspaper and NGO reports, this
article explores popular responses to ZANU PF’s devastating Operation
Murambatsvina, commonly dubbed Zimbabwe’s tsunami, which targeted
informal markets and ‘illegal’ housing across Zimbabwe between May and
August of 2005, making an estimated 700,000 people homeless and indirectly
affecting a quarter of Zimbabwe’s population. The article argues that central
to experiences of these dramatic events ‘on the ground’ (particularly in
Harare’s high- and low-density suburbs of Chitungwiza and Hatfield, where
most of the ethnographic material was collected) was a profound tension
between the resonances evoked by official appeals to a reassertion of ‘order’
and formal planning procedures, and the spectacle of ZANU PF’s public
demonstration of its ability to deploy state ‘force’ ruthlessly, and indeed
‘arbitrarily’; that is, as, when and how it chose. Although the brutal execution
of the programme was widely condemned by observers and victims alike, less
reported has been the way in which official justifications for the operation
were sometimes recognizable and salient to people living in urban areas across
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Zimbabwe, resonating with memories of past clearances, or with longstanding
and divergent aspirations for respectability, urban ‘order’, and a functioning,
bureaucratic state. It is argued that in the ambiguity and uncertainty generated
by this tension the political advantages of the operation for the ruling party
become most apparent. Relating the plethora of rumours circulating at the time
(about the ‘hidden agendas’ behind the operation) to Mbembe’s work on post-
colonial conviviality, the article argues that like Mbembe’s satirical cartoons
these rumours did not so much undermine or subvert the authority of ZANU
PF as reinforce its omnipotent presence. However, unlike the pessimism of
Mbembe’s vision of all encompassing power, it is argued that if the rumours
that circulated about Operation Murambatsvina are an example of the constant
re-making of ‘stateness’ on the margins, then the uncertain ambiguity of such
rumours can not only reinforce the omnipotent presence of the ‘state power’,
but also illustrate the omnipresence of its fundamental insecurity.
RÉSUMÉ
À partir de matériel ethnographique, d’articles de presse et de rapports d’ONG,
cet article explore les réponses populaires à l’opération Murambatsvina du
ZANU PF, initiative désastreuse communément surnommée le tsunami du
Zimbabwe; elle ciblait les marchés informels et les constructions « illégales »
au Zimbabwe entre mai et août 2005, affectant indirectement un quart de
la population du Zimbabwe et laissant sans abri 700 000 personnes, selon
des estimations. L’article soutient que les expériences de ces événements
dramatiques « sur le terrain » (notamment à Chitungwiza et Hatfield, banlieues
d’Harare à forte et faible densité de population, où a été recueilli l’essentiel du
matériel ethnographique) avaient pour élément central une profonde tension
entre les résonances évoquées par les appels officiels à un rétablissement
de l’« ordre » et de procédures d’urbanisme formelles, et le spectacle offert
par le ZANU PF en démontrant publiquement sa capacité à déployer
la « force » de l’État sans ménagement et même arbitrairement, à savoir
en jugeant lui-même de la pertinence, de la manière et du moment. Si
l’exécution brutale du programme a certes été largement condamnée par les
observateurs et les victimes, un moindre écho a été donné à la manière dont les
justifications officielles à l’opération étaient parfois reconnaissables et évidentes
aux yeux des habitants des zones urbaines du Zimbabwe, résonnant avec des
souvenirs d’anciennes expulsions ou avec de vieilles aspirations divergentes à
la respectabilité, à l’« ordre » urbain et à un état bureaucratique fonctionnel.
L’article affirme que c’est dans l’ambiguïté et l’incertitude générées par cette
tension que les avantages politiques de l’opération pour le parti au pouvoir
se manifestent le plus. En rapportant la pléthore de rumeurs qui ont circulé
à l’époque (concernant les intentions qui se cachaient derrière l’opération) à
l’œuvre de Mbembe sur la convivialité post-coloniale, l’article soutient que
ces rumeurs, tout comme les dessins satiriques de Mbembe, ont davantage
renforcé la présence omnipotente du ZANU PF que porté atteinte ou menacé
son autorité. Cependant, contrairement à la vision pessimiste que Mbembe a
du pouvoir omniprésent, l’article avance que si les rumeurs qui ont circulé à
propos de l’opération Murambatsvina sont un exemple du renouveau constant
de l’« étatité » à la marge, l’ambiguïté incertaine de telles rumeurs ne peut donc
pas seulement renforcer la présence omnipotente du « pouvoir d’État », mais
également illustrer l’omniprésence de son insécurité fondamentale.
